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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent mischaracterizes the District Court's Ruling. 
First, the District Court did not interpret the contested 
statute as procedural. The District Court's Ruling was 
squarely based upon the interpretation that Utah Code Ann, 
§30-1-4.5, the Common Law Marriage statute, divested the 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Second, the Respondent takes excessive editorial license 
the District Court's Ruling as justification for non-
compliance with the applicable rules of civil procedure. 
Third, the Respondent can't reconcile his analysis, the 
lower court's ruling herein, the prior decision of Bunch v. 
Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,(Utah Ct. App., 1995) with the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah, 
1994). 
Fourth, the Respondent did not file a cross appeal and 
therefore can not attack the lower court's ruling against 




RESPONDENT TAKES INAPPROPRIATE LICENSE WITH THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S RULING, 
SUBPOINT A 
RESPONDENT MISCHARACTERIZES HIS MOTION TO DISMISS AS 
PROCEDURAL. 
In summary Mr. Snarr claims he may ignore the applicable 
rules of civil procedure due to the lower court's 
interpretation that Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 as a separate 
and superceding procedural mechanism. This is a 
misstatement of the lower court's ruling. 
Respondent's Brief at p. 13, infers Mr. Snarr was 
granted leave to amend his answer. Mr. Snarr fails to cite 
the record in support of that proposition. In fact, no such 
relief was granted by either the Commissioner nor the 
District Judge. The District Judge's ruling is based 
entirely upon Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 and Bunch V. 
F.nglehorn 906 P.2d 918, (Utah Ct. App., 1995) 
The ruling and the Order Dismissing the Petition for 
Divorce is squarely based upon the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Therefore, whether or not Mr. Snarr properly 
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pled the statute, the district was void of jurisdiction 
pursuant to Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,(Utah Ct. App., 
1995). (Order Dismissing Action, R. 229; District Court 
Ruling February 11, 1999, Tr.21, L.3-9; ££L£, Petitioner's 
Addendum, p. 28, 29) 
Respondent further embellishes the lower court's 
acquiescence in the matter by inappropriately omitting the 
full procedural history of the case. Respondent 
conveniently forgets that this matter was originally set for 
trial on May 27, 1998. That date was reset by the trial 
court on its own motion six (6) days prior to trial. Mr. 
Snarr omits that he did not file his motion to dismiss 30 
days prior to the first trial date as required by Rule 4-
501(3)(g), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Similarly, Mr. Snarr would misled his audience to 
believe his catch all Rule 12(b)(6), U.R.Civ,P.f motion 
included his procedural analysis of the applicable statute. 
In fact, Mr. Snarr's eleventh hour motion on the second 
trial date, was based upon subject matter jurisdiction, Utah 
Rules of civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1). (R.124) It is 
disingenuous to claim Mr. Snarr had always intended his only 
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affirmative defense to be all inclusive for statute of 
limitations, subject matter jurisdiction or a specific 
statute of procedure defending against a common law 
marriage. 
Assuming Mr. Snarr insists that Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 
is a procedural statute, he has yet to assert a justifiable 
reason for not pleading the statute as an affirmative 
defense. Although Mr. Snarr will not concede or label the 
statute as one of limitations, Mr. Snarr's brief argues the 
statute is a procedural mechanism.(Appellee7s Brief, p.24) 
Assuming the lower court adopted that analysis, Mr. 
Snarr is not permitted to ignore Rule 9, U.R.Civ.P. Rule 9 
governs special pleadings, statute of limitations (Rule 
9(h)), conditions precedent (Rule 9(c)), and private 
statutes (Rule 9(i)). In arguendo, if Mr. Snarr's all 
inclusive Rule 12(b)(6) affirmative defense include the Rule 
9 requirements, it does not obviate the time requirements of 
Rule 6, U.R.Civ.P.f and Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration for his dispositive motion. 
Only one rationalization exists for the lower court's 
ruling and the time requirements of the rules of procedure. 
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Namely, the trial court determine, and did in fact find, 
that the issue at hand was subject matter jurisdiction and 
capable of being raised at any time, including sua sponte. 
Mr. Snarr's rationalization that the contested statute is 
procedure or he otherwise specifically pled the statute is 
an after the fact contrivance. 
If Mr. Snarr had the same contemporaneous analysis when 
he filed his answer, as alleged in his brief, it is 
inexcusable to file a dispositive motion on the day of 
trial. That excuse wears thinner by adding the fact that 
the trial was the second such setting and nothing had been 
filed prior to the first trial date in May, 1998. 
Finally, Mr. Snarr alleges that Petitioner's counsel 
waived any timeliness objection by requesting permission to 
file a responsive brief. On the day of trial, August 12, 
1998, Petitioner made the following statement and the outset 
of oral argument. 
THE COURT...I had not received a copy of the Motion or 
seen the original or was otherwise aware of it. I 
believe Mr. Cutler was aware of the motion and he also 
indicated he was going to be relying on the case of 
Hansen v. Hansen 342 Utah Advanced Reports 25 filed May 
7, 1998. I have and Counsel graciously supplied me with 
a copy of each of these cases which I have now read. At 
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that time I asked Mr. Cutler if he was prepared to argue 
the motion and he indicated that he was. I do not have 
a memorandum filed in opposition for this motion, but I 
understand that the parties are ready to argue this 
motion nonetheless. Is that correct, counsel, have I 
stated everything — have I summarized everything that we 
talked about in chambers and done so accurately? 
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. CUTLER: That is accurate, Your Honor. I would just 
supplement that obviously this motion (sic) be brought 
at the end of my case in chief and I am prepared to 
argue that. I am not waiving the timeliness issue or 
what other information I might have been able to provide 
you had I had an opportunity to provide a memoranda. 
THE COURT: Well, a motion is jurisdictional. A 
jurisdictional claim can be raised at any time. The 
motion is not timely in the sense that it should have 
been filed more than 30 days prior to the day of trial 
and I prepared, if you are requesting it, to give you a 
continuance to file a written response to this motion 
and otherwise prepared adequately to respond to it, but 
if you do not wish to have a continuance, then I will 
deem that as not a valid waiver, you, I believe that you 
have waived your right to claim additional time to 
respond to it. 
MR. CUTLER: I am not requesting a continuance, Your 
Honor. I was simply, because Mr. Cook claims this is a 
jurisdictional motion we dispute that but we are 
prepared to argue it. (August 12, 1998 Transcript of 
Argument, Tr.3-4; See Petitioner's Addendum, p.32) 
The issue of waiver is further discussed between counsel 
and the trial court later during oral argument. 
THE COURT: ...Mr. Cutler, maybe I didn't understand what 
you said you were not waiving. Was(sic) it is that you 
are not waiving? 
MR. CUTLER: Your Honor, the right to respond, if 
necessary to address certainly the constitutional issue 
which should be (inaudible) if we get to that point, but 
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I am prepare to argue about this issue of waiver and 
whether or not the four corners of the pleadings they 
stand on their own and my point to the court is simply 
their prayer for relief was giving a decree of divorce 
and now that's changed 48 hours previously without any 
other prior filed(sic). 
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that this does require 
additional briefing. I am concerned about, actually the 
constitutional issue seems to be addressed, well, its 
not, yes or no, addressed by the Court of Appeals. It 
[Englehorn opinion] indicates at the trial court, the 
issue is not preserved in the trial court and therefore 
it wasn't specifically addressed but in the footnote 
they indicated that a narrow area in which they had 
constitutional concerns and I don't, you know, whether 
you can infer that there is some other constitutional 
concern they have about the statute as it was presented 
on the facts is open to some question, I suppose... 
So I need some additional briefing with regard to these 
various aspects of the motion. I'd also note that 
although a jurisdictional issue, assuming it is 
jurisdictional issue can be raised at any time, it is 
under the Code of Judicial Administration, motions must 
be filed at least 30 days prior to trial. This was 
filed two days prior to trial. That made all of this 
argument much more difficult and the issues were ripe 
months ago for the filing of this motion. 
Having said all that, I am going to take this 
motion under advisement. I may even require that 
although I have considered this motion at this time, I 
may require that this first be submitted to the 
commissioner as required by the Code of Judicial 
Administration and reargue it. So, the only question 
now is whether to proceed with the trial or whether to 
continue the trial and the parties are ready to proceed 
to trial is that correct? 
MR. CUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. 
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Immediately thereafter a conference in chambers and on 
the record, occurred. 
THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in the 
matter of Snarr v. Snarr. The record should reflect the 
Court is in session in chambers. The parties are not 
present. Counsel came in and we've had a brief 
discussion. We're making a record of that discussion 
now. Mr. Cutler, came in and indicated that he felt 
that it was appropriate for him to be given the time to 
do a full briefing of the issues that were raised by 
this motion today and therefore, albeit reluctantly, is 
requesting a continuance of the trial and reluctantly it 
appears to me based upon the fact that the parties were 
ready for trial, the trial had to be continued once 
before and I presume and infer from all of this that 
they are at least Ms. Snarr is anxious to proceed to the 
trial. The respondent is not objecting to this given 
that it was respondent who filed the motion just two 
days before the trial. 
Have I summarized this fairly accurate. 
MR. CUTLER: That's accurate, Your Honor. 
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Accurately? And the issues that need 
to be briefed are the constitutionality of the statute 
as applied to the facts in this case and also the issue 
of whether by virtue of the pleadings or other conduct 
of the parties in the record known to counsel there has 
been a concession by respondent that there was a common 
law marriage, not just to an element or even a couple of 
elements, but whether there has been a concession as to 
whether there is a common law marriage. And as to this, 
I would expect this really to take the form, it's more 
raised in the matter of a Motion for Summary - - or at 
least the response today challenges by looking to the 
pleadings, is claiming that reasonable inferences drawn 
from the answer and complain when read in conjunction 
with one another and the prayer suggests that there was 
a concession to the issue of whether there was common 
law marriage and that the respondent was focusing on the 
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terms of a divorce decree as opposed to contesting the 
existence of a common law marriage. Is that all clear? 
So I want that fully briefed.... 
So, based upon all of this, and I am reluctant to 
do it too, because I know the parties were prepared to 
go to trial. I certainly was prepared to hear the 
trial. But the issues are of vital importance it seems 
to be to both parties and it involves an attack on the 
constitutionality of the statute. So, given the high 
stakes involved, the length of the relationship that we 
are talking about here I think that this needs full and 
careful deliberation and this process will accommodate 
that and I don't see a way of accommodating that goal 
without striking the trial and proceeding in this 
fashion. (August 12, 1998, Tr.15-20; See Petitioner's 
Addendum, p.32) 
A reasonable interpretation of the argument and colloquy 
between counsel and district judge results in the following 
interpretation. First, everyone was ready for trial. 
Second, but for the last minute motion the trial would have 
proceeded. Third, the trial court was also concerned why 
such a motion would not have been filed prior to the first 
trial date and so late in reference to the second trial 
date. 
Fourth, the trial court was clearly conflicted with two 
issues, (a) Mr. Snarr's waiving his affirmative defense 
under the Common Law Marriage statute (Tr.19,L.5-13) and (b) 
the importance of the constitutional challenge (Tr. 20, L.7-
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17). Mr. Snarr's assertions that his motion was simply a 
procedural process belies the record. 
Fifth, the only consistent reconciliation of the trial 
court's comments and the trial court's ruling establishes 
the issue as a subject matter jurisdiction question. 
Otherwise, the trial court could not have overlooked the 
extreme tardiness in filing a procedural motion as claimed 
by Mr. Snarr. 
SUBPOINT B 
RESPONDENT INAPPROPRIATELY CLAIMS PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO 
FILE A RESPONSIVE BRIEF CURES MR. SNARR'S UNTIMELY MOTION. 
Mr. Snarr asserts his procedural motion and any defect 
in notice is cured by the trial court wanting additional 
briefing. Mr. Snarr further asserts that Petitioner waived 
any timeliness objection she had by agreeing to more 
briefing. As the trial court noted during oral argument in 
August, 1998, 
A
...I'd also note that although a jurisdictional issue, 
assuming it is jurisdictional issue can be raised at any 
time, it is under the Code of Judicial Administration, 
motions must be filed at least 30 days prior to trial. 
This was filed two days prior to trial. That made all 
of this argument much more difficult and the issues were 
ripe months ago for the filing of this motion.'(August 
12, 1998 Trial date, Tr.l7,L.3-9, See Petitioner's 
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Addendum, p. 32) 
The rules of civil procedure are not simply time clocks 
that deactivate upon the filing of a brief. The purpose is 
to present an orderly process to deal with dispositive 
motions. Therefore without some further justification, Mr. 
Snarr is hard pressed to present a compelling argument in 
support of an eleventh hour filing. As to date the 
following arguments have been presented. 
First, his motion is based in his all inclusive Rule 
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. However, his 
August 12, 1998 motion was based upon Rule 12(b)(1), subject 
matter jurisdiction.(R.124) Mr. Snarr apparently overlook 
Rule 12(h), U.R.Civ.P. *A party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present by either motion as 
hereinbefore provided, (Rule 6(d), five day notice; Rule 4-
501(3)(g), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 30 days 
prior to trial) or if he has made no motion, in his 
answer..." 
Second, Mr. Snarr claimed his ^procedural' motion to 
dismiss is not waived if the responding party needs more 
time for briefing. In sum, Mr. Snarr's procedural motion 
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sat in limbo for 13 months after it was ripe, Mr. Snarr did 
not conduct any discovery regarding the elements of a common 
law marriage as alleged in Appellee's brief. In fact, he 
filed all the traditional arguments against Mrs. Snarr's 
alimony motion just 30 days prior to the first trial 
date. (JS£L£/ Respondent's Affidavits to Petitioner's Order to 
Show Cause. R.110) 
It is disingenuous to claim the elements of common law 
marriage are now in issue four months after the close of the 
pleadings. Mr. Snarr's defenses were available to him at 
the first Order to Show Cause for alimony in September, 
1997, and available prior to two separate pre-trial hearings 
before the Commissioner and the assigned trial judge, 
(November, 1997 and January, 1998 respectively) and most 
recently as a defense to the last Order to Show Cause in 
April, 1998. 
If the elements and defenses of a common law marriage 
were honestly contemplated in Mr. Snarr's original answer, 
he waived the same by not filing the appropriate dispositive 
motion in a timely manner prior to the May, 1998 trial date. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE MATTER IS DISMISSED FOR 
WANT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CONTRADICTS WHYTE V, 
BLAIRf 885 P.2D 791 (UTAH, 1994). 
The very essence of Mr. Snarr's claim is Bunch v. 
Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,(Utah Ct. App., 1995) divests the 
district court of subject matter jurisdiction after one 
year. Both Mr. Snarr's contention and the trial court's 
ruling herein, are formulated upon this Court's opinion in 
Englehorn, id. 
In that matter, this Court upheld the trial court's 
dismissal. However, in Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah, 
1994) the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the Common Law 
Marriage statute can not be reconciled with Mr. Snarr's 
assertions. 
In Whyte, id. the Utah Supreme Court was reviewing a 
district court's dismissal of a claim by an injured 
automobile passenger against an insurance company. In 
summary, Mr. Whyte was a passenger in Mr. Blair's automobile 
when it collided with another vehicle. Mr. Blair was 
uninsured. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Whyte had been living 
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with Linda Mitchell whom had an uninsured motorist policy 
for herself and family members. Mr. Whyte sued his "live-
in' s" insurance company, American States, to cover him as a 
family member. Mr. Whyte and his partner had lived together 
for three years prior to the accident in 1991. 
The district court refused to enter a nunc pro tunc 
order and dismissed the action against the insurance company 
finding that without a court or administrative order in 
place at the time of the automobile collision, no marriage 
existed. 
The Utah Supreme Court in a unanimous decision made an 
extension dissection of the differences between a nunc pro 
tunc remedy and an action to solemnize a relationship prior 
to a date in question. In summary, the Utah Supreme Court 
found the trial court erred and that the parties were 
entitled to remand for the purpose of determining the 
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5. 
However, in two separate statements, the Utah Supreme 
Court is apparently not troubled by Mr. Snarr's claimed 
jurisdictional defenses. In dicta, the Court reviewed other 
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states common law marriage cases and made the following 
comment. 
Under the common law and under state statutes like 
Utah's that adopt common law principles, the effect of a 
court order has always been to formally recognize a 
lawful marriage that began before the order was entered 
and existed from that time until terminated, most often 
by death of one spouse. Id. at 795 (Emphasis Added) 
The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed the legislative 
history of Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5. Despite Mr. Snarr's 
speculation in his brief regarding the legislative purpose, 
the unanimous court made following observations. 
Although the legislative summary does not expressly 
declare the reasons the Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. 
§30-1-4.5 and changed what had been basic Utah marriage law, 
the Legislature's purpose is clear: A marriage under the 
statute is valid from the time it is entered. If such a 
marriage were valid only from the time of the entry of a 
formal order, then that marriage would not differ from 
traditional marriages and the adoption of a common law form 
of marriage would serve no purpose. The only advantage of a 
common law marriage is to give formal recognition to 
marriages informally entered into the past, id. 794 (See, 
Legislative Summary S.B. 156, Petitioner's Addendum, p. 35) 
The Utah Supreme Court then cites with approval several 
sister state Supreme Court decisions upholding the principle 
that a formal order is likely to be entered after the fact. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court leaves without comment 
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the 
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underlying litigation in Whyte was not completed within one 
year of the stated event, neither the insurance company nor 
the Court, sua sponte, raised subject matter jurisdiction as 
a deterrent to plaintiff's remedy. 
In summary, Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 is unique in 
construction. A review of similar statutes in other states 
reveals no similar comparison regarding the Mrop-dead' 
effect of the one year restriction. Petitioner can not 
locate any other Utah State statute with any similar effect. 
The routine and orderly presentation of litigation requires 
commencement of a legal action within a specified time 
period. Nothing is comparable to Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 
which requires completion of litigation as a precondition 
for a remedy. 
POINT III 
APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In Appellee's Brief, Mr. Snarr asserts entitlement to 
attorney's fees from the lower court. Mr. Snarr has again 
waived an issue by failing to file the appropriate pleading, 
namely a Cross Appeal. 
Although a party engaged in an appeal may seek the fees 
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for the appeal, Wallis v. Thomas, 632 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1991), 
a party may not attack the lower court's ruling without 
filing a cross appeal. In Henretty v. Manti City Corp,, 791 
P.2d 506 (Utah, 1990) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
predecessor Rule 4, Utah S. Ct. R., and mandated a cross 
appeal to challenge a lower court's ruling on fees. 
The Appellee is not entitled to fees under Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. A simple review of Mr. 
Snarr's actions in this matter is ample evidence that this 
appeal is not a delaying tactic. These parties remained 
together as husband and wife in excess of 20 years. They 
had two children together and continually held themselves 
out as married. But for Mr. Snarr raising this eleventh 
hour issue, the matter would have been overlooked. In fact, 
it was Mr. Snarr who supposedly knew he had a valid defense 
but did nothing with it for over 13 months (July, 1997 
through August, 1998) . 
Judge Stirba's observations during the August 12th trial 
date most accurately describe the issues presented to her. 
She stated in pertinent part, 
...But the issues are of vital importance it seems to be 
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to both parties and it involves an attack on the 
constitutionality of the statute. So, given the high 
stakes involved, the length of the relationship that we 
are talking about here I think that this needs full and 
careful deliberation and this process will accommodate 
that..." August 12, 1998 Trial, Tr. 20;£££, Petitioner's 
Addendum, p. 32) 
Appellee again raises last minute issues for the first 
time in Appellee's Brief. As in the lower court, Mr. Snarr 
again fails to follow the appropriate procedure. He could 
have presented his claim for fees to this Court by first 
filing a cross appeal, or file a motion for summary 
disposition pursuant to Rule 10, Utah R. App. P. The 
repeated failure to properly comply only validates 
Petitioner's complaints below. The Appellee's eleventh hour 
issues over fees obviates the rules of procedure and should 
sustain Petitioner's appeal on the merits. 
The appellant has previously requested attorney's fees 
at the lower court and reasserts that request herein. Ms. 
Snarr seeks the matter to be reversed and remanded for 
determination of appropriate attorney's fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Snarr's technically permissive use of alternate 
theories to support his last minute effort to disavow his 
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relationship with his wife of 20 plus years is noteworthy. 
However, he can not have it both ways. He last minute 
motion violated Rule 6, 8(c), 9, and 12(h), U.R.Civ.P. 
He then claims that the chaos created by his last minute 
motion is cured by permitting the opposing party time to 
respond. 
Prejudice is not cured by mere timing. Mr. Snarr 
central thesis is a factual claim that although he lived 
with Mrs. Snarr from 1980 through 1996, he did not consent 
to a marital contract. That factual issue was waived by the 
four corners of the pleadings. Mr. Snarr never amended his 
answer or deviated from his Prayer for Relief, namely, y...a 
Decree of Divorce be entered in accordance with his Answer.' 
(R.7) 
Mr. Snarr alternatively argues he is entitled to wait 13 
months before springing his theory that subject matter 
jurisdiction prevents the trial court from hearing the case. 
As discussed in Appellant's primary brief, the Utah Common 
Law Marriage statute does not divest the district court of 
jurisdiction. 
No other statutory comparison exists. To sustain the 
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statute's constitutionality, a proper interpretation is that 
the action must be commenced within the one (1) year 
restriction.. Otherwise, the irrational Mrop dead' 
provision stopping all litigation after one year becomes 
unsupportable. 
Finally, the issues presented to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for the first time are complex and have significant 
impact. These issues are based upon a legitimate disputes 
of the facts, law and the procedure that Appellee prompted 
before the lower court. The Petitioner is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Mrs. Snarr further 
requests the matter be remanded for trial and determination 
of an award of attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this 
matter. 
Respectfully submitted this vy^ ) day of December, 1999. 
L. G.^CUTLER 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
20 
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OPINION 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice : 
James R. Whyte appeals an order denying his motion for 
summary judgment and dismissing American States Insurance. Tl 
Whyte claimed that he was lawfully married to Linda Mitchell and 
therefore was "covered" under her auto insurance policy issued by 
American States Insurance as a member of her family, although 
their marriage was not solemnized. 
On September 5, 1991, Whyte was injured when the car he 
was in, driven by Brent A. Blair, collided with a car driven by 
Glen L. Taylor. Blair was uninsured. 
At the time of the accident, Whyte had been living with 
Linda Mitchell for three years. Mitchell had an uninsured 
motorist policy in the amount of $ 50,000 with American States 
Insurance that covered "family members." Mr. Whyte asserts that 
at the time of the accident, he was a family member by marriage 
to Ms. Mitchell. That marriage has never been solemnized. 
However, in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1989), a 
marriage that is not solemnized may still be valid. Section 
30-1-4.5 states: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative 
order establishes that it arises out of a contract between two 
consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship described 
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination 
of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under 
this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
The district court ruled (1) that a marriage is not valid 
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 until a court or administrative 
order is entered, and (2) that there was not a sufficient showing 
of "good cause" to enter a nunc pro tunc order. Consequently, the 
court held that Mr. Whyte and Ms. Mitchell were not married at 
the time of the accident and Mr. Whyte was not covered by Ms. 
Mitchell's policy with American States Insurance. 
Mr. Whyte argues that Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 does not 
preclude a court order establishing that he was married to Ms. 
Mitchell at the time of the accident and that there is no 
statutory requirement that he demonstrate "good cause" for such 
an order to be entered. We agree. 
To frame the issue, we must make an important distinction. 
An order entered today may establish that a marriage was 
contracted and in existence sometime in the past. This is 
different from a nunc pro tunc order, which is entered by a court 
but by operation of law is treated as if it were legally entered 
at a prior time. Entry of a nunc pro tunc order ordinarily 
requires a showing of good cause. An order that simply 
adjudicates a prior judicial fact or status ordinarily requires 
no such showing. The issue is whether Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 
permits an order to establish that a lawful marriage existed 
prior to the entry of the order. In essence, the issue is whether 
that provision establishes "common law marriage" as a lawful form 
of marriage. 
Prior to 1987, Utah never recognized common law marriages; 
indeed, such marriages were expressly prohibited. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-1-2(3) (1984) (repealed by § 30-1-4.5 (1987)); In re Vetas' 
Estate, 110 Utah 187, 190, 170 P.2d 183, 184 (1946); see also 
Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
We begin with the plain language of the statute. See 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). Section 
30-1-4.5 clearly directs that a court or administrative order may 
establish that a marriage was previously entered into and that it 
was lawful as of that time. Subsection (2) states that the court 
or administrative order must be entered "within one year 
following the termination of that relationship." An order that 
recognizes a marriage and is entered after the relationship has 
terminated must, by necessity, recognize that the marriage 
existed before the order was entered. Thus, the order merely 
recognizes that a woman and a man have by their prior consent and 
conduct entered into a marital relationship, although it was not 
theretofore formally solemnized or otherwise legally recognized. 
Section 30-1-4.5 declares that such a marriage is valid despite 
not having been solemnized. Thus, if the elements of § 30-1-4.5 
subsections (1)(a) through (e) are established, then a lawful 
marriage may be found to have existed prior to the entry of the 
order by a court or administrative body. State v. Johnson, 856 
P.2d 1064, 1069 (Utah 1993). 12 
The legislative history of section 30-1-4.5 clearly 
indicates that it is a codification of common law marriage 
principles. Office of Legislative Research & General Counsel, 
Summary S.B. 156 Recognition of Common Law Marriages (1987). The 
summary of Senate Bill 156 expressly refers to the bill as a 
common law marriage provision. It states, "Once a common law 
marriage has been found to exist by a court or administrative 
order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes." 
Although the legislative summary does not expressly 
declare the reasons the Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. § 
30-1-4.5 and changed what had been basic Utah marriage law, the 
Legislature's purpose is clear: A marriage under the statute is 
valid from the time it is entered. If such a marriage were valid 
only from the time of the entry of a formal order, then that 
marriage would not differ from traditional marriages and the 
adoption of a common law form of marriage would serve no purpose. 
The only advantage of a common law marriage is to give formal 
recognition to marriages informally entered into in the past. 
Under the common law and under state statutes like Utahfs 
that adopt common law principles, the effect of a court order has 
always been to formally recognize a lawful marriage that began 
before the order was entered and existed from that time until 
terminated, most often upon the death of one spouse. See, e.g., 
Travers v. Remhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 432, 51 L. Ed. 865, 27 S. Ct. 
563 (1907) (decedent's widow "was his lawful wife at the time of 
his death and . . . had been his lawful wife for many years prior 
thereto"); People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 667 (Colo. 1987) (en 
banc); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645 
P.2d 356, 362 (Idaho 1982); In re Estate of Hendrickson, 248 Kan. 
72, 805 P.2d 20, 25 (Kan. 1991) ("a valLd common-law marriage 
existed between" decedent and widow prior to his death and entry 
of the court order); Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 
1986); In re Estate of Murnion, 212 Mont. 107, 686 P.2d 893, 900 
(Mont. 1984). Another example of the principle is found in In re 
Estate of Eliasen, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1983). 
There, a man and a woman consensually assumed marital obligations 
and habitation in 1967 without solemnization. Later, in 1970, 
they had a formal marriage ceremony. In a divorce decree, the 
court ruled that the marriage began in 1967, not in 1970. Id. at 
114. 
It follows that the nunc pro tunc statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-49-1, is inapplicable and Whyte need not show "good cause" 
for the court to enter an order recognizing his marriage, 
assuming that the statutory prerequisites are complied with. 
In determining whether a relationship satisfies the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (a) through (e), 
numerous factors should be considered. No single factor is 
determinative. See People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 665 (Colo. 
1987) (en banc). Evidence of each element is essential. 
Consenting parties must show cohabitation, assumption of marital 
rights and duties, a general reputation as husband and wife, 
capacity to marry, and capacity to give consent. Often these five 
elements of section 30-1-4.5(1) (a) through (e) can be proved or 
disproved with relative ease. However, whether the parties 
consented to be married is often disputed. See, e.g. , State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Utah 1993); Lucero, 747 P.2d at 
665; Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 1986). 
The best evidence of marital consent is a written 
agreement, signed by both parties, manifesting their consent. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645 P.2d 
356, 361 (Idaho 1982). The testimony of others who were present 
when the agreement to assume all marital responsibilities was 
made could also be highly persuasive. Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 
U.S. 423, 436, 51 L. Ed. 865, 27 S. Ct. 563 (1907); Metropolitan 
Life, 645 P.2d at 361; In re Estate of Murnion, 212 Mont. 107, 
686 P.2d 893, 908 (Mont. 1984) (Haswell, C.J., dissenting). 
Despite the form of evidence used to show marital consent, what 
must be shown by the party claiming the benefit of an 
unsolemnized marriage is that at some point mutual consent was 
given. 13 This has at times been expressed by the statement that 
a common law marriage must take place immediately or not at all, 
Murnion, 686 P.2d at 899, or alternatively, that a relationship 
illicit in its inception is presumed to be illicit throughout the 
period of cohabitation. Id. at 897. 
Under the common law, the most customary proof of marital 
consent was general reputation, cohabitation, and acknowledgment. 
Travers, 205 U.S. at 437; Lucero, 747 P.2d at 665. Under Utah's 
codification, evidence of general reputation, cohabitation, and 
assumption of marital rights and duties would be evidence of 
consent, but standing alone, would not be sufficient. See In re 
Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1977) 
(cohabitation alone is insufficient). Section 30-1-4.5 requires 
general reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital 
obligations as separate elements in addition to consent. The 
following nonexhaustive list suggests probative evidence that has 
been used by other courts to establish consent: maintenance of 
joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership 
of property; the use of the man's surname by the woman and/or the 
children of the union; the filing of joint tax returns; speaking 
of each other in the presence of third parties as being married; 
and declaring the relationship in documents executed by them 
while living together, such as deeds, wills, and other formal 
instruments. Travers, 205 U.S. at 441; Lucero, 747 P.2d at 665; 
Winegard, 257 N.W.2d at 616. 
Care must be given to guard against fraudulent marriage 
claims, Lucero, 747 P.2d at 664, especially where a declaration 
of marriage would reap financial rewards for an alleged spouse. 
When a reward is available, human nature may choose to strengthen 
and augment, in retrospect, the consent to marry that was only 
tentative before the reward became available. Murnion, 686 P.2d 
at 909 (Haswell, C.J., dissenting). Because a court or an 
administrative order will provide the same privileges to the 
parties to a marriage under the statute as the privileges under a 
formal marriage, the same duties must be imposed. A couple may 
not enter and exit a marriage for simple financial convenience. 
Where financial gain is at issue, acknowledgment of marital 
consent by the woman and the man may be less persuasive if 
contradictory evidence is presented. But if the acknowledgment is 
uncontradicted or if it does not benefit the man or the woman but 
rather some third party, then the acknowledgment may be more 
persuasive. 
The district court's order is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to determine if a valid marriage existed prior to the 
accident. 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael R. Murphy, District Judge 
Russon, Justice, having disqualified himself, does not 
participate herein; Murphy, District Judge, sat. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
Tl Pursuant to a subsequent stipulation, the other parties 
were also dismissed, making the judgment final. 
12 Defendants argue that Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), and Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), are applicable. They are not. Each of those cases 
considered the validity of a common law marriage in Utah prior to 
1987. Because such marriages were prohibited prior to 1987, they 
were not valid. By contrast, in the present case the relationship 
that possibly establishes a common law marriage existed well 
after 1987. 
13 Although mutual consent is required, consent also may 
be established by acquiescence. In a divorce proceeding, the 
consent of the man to marry may be based on his objective words 
and actions that led the woman to believe that he had consented 
to marriage, despite later denying it. In re Marriage of 
Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1977). This is consistent 
with one purpose of section 30-1-4.5 to avoid "man in the house" 
welfare problems. Office of Legislative Research & General 
Counsel, Summary S.B. 156 Recognition of Common Law Marriages 
(1987). 
In contrast, strong evidence of consent, such as (1) 
living together for 19 years, (2) having a child, (3) having a 
general reputation as married, and (4) having the mother of one 
of the partners living with them, was held insufficient to 
establish consent where the woman refused the man's marriage 
proposals on several occasions and some of their financial 
affairs were handled separately. Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 
832 P.2d 259, 262 (Haw. 1992). 
In common law marriage cases, consent is the most 
frequently litigated issue. States vary widely in its treatment. 
Its development in Utah will necessarily proceed on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(c) 1992-1998 LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier 
Inc. 
